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Doha Development Agenda Negotiation on Agricultural Sector

Doha Development Agenda Negotiations
On Agricultural Sector
Asianto Sinainbela1
Ketika Putaran Doha resmi dibuka di Doha, Qatar pads
November 2901, Negara anggota WTO menyetujm putaran
ini dlnamakan "Doha Development Agenda" (DDA).
Sebagian besar Negara berkembang berpendapat bafiwa
putaran perundingan perdagangan sebelumnya telah
menciptakan aturan-aturan yang hanya menguntungkan
Negara-negara maja yang berpendapatan tinggi dan
mendominasi perdagangan global saat ini. Tulisan ini
menyajikan informasi-informasi pads perkembangan
penmdingan dalam DDA di btdang pertanian, Dalam
rangka meningkatkan reformasi
pertanian guna
rnemperoleft sistein perdagangan global yang tebih adit
dan sederajat, tulisan ini memberikan gambaran proposal
dan posisi yang ditunjukan oteh Negara-negara
berkembang dalam perundingan-pentndingan WTO dalam
3 pilar permatahan, yaitu akses pasar (market access),
duhtngan dalam negeri (domestic support), dan subsidt
ekspor (export subsidies).

General Background
The post World War II international trading system was
established on the basic premise that trade is fundamentally in the
interest of all parties and contribute to growth, welfare,
development and prosperity. This of course refers exclusively to
1 Penulis adalah diplomat karir dan saat ini menjabat sebagai Direktur
Perdagangan, Perindustrian, investasi dan HfU Departemen Luar Negeri
Republik Indonesia. Beliau mcndapatkan gelar Saijana Hukum (SH) dari
Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia (1984) dan gelar LLM dari Washington
College of Laws, The American University, Washington D.C, USA (1992).
Selain aktif menghadiri konferensi dan seminar interaasional yang berkaitan
dengan hukum internasional, beliau juga pernah mengikut) The 13* WTO Trade
Policy Course di Jenewa, Swiss, 2000 dan The 4* UNEP Global Training
Programme ini Environmental Law and Policy, Nairobi, Kenya 1999..
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legal trade that requires a legal framework. The General Agreement
on Trade and Tariff (GATT) produced a code of law, while the
World Trade Organization (WTO) extended the law and assumed
greater powers of enforcement through the establishment of a quasi
judicial dispute settlement mechanism.
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was negotiated in
the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and included specific commitments to improve market access and reduce trade-distorting subsidies in agriculture. The long term objective of this reform is to
establish a fair and market-oriented agriculture trading system. The
preamble of the AoA also mentioned that the negotiations aim at
correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets by strengthening and rendering more operationally
effective GATT rules and disciplines on agriculture support and
protection, and substantially reducing agricultural support.
In spite of this objective, many developing countries saw their
development endeavors adversely affected by the outcome of the
Uruguay Round negotiations. The experience of developing
countries with trade liberalization during the last decade has shown
that the massive subsidies and protection in agriculture in major
developed countries have not been successfully addressed. The
distortions and imbalances in agriculture trade have depressed the
prices of agriculture products, as well as incomes and livelihoods of
small farmers in developing countries3. Since the launched of the
current Doha Development Agenda (DDA) trade negotiations,
efforts to liberalize and rebalance global agriculture trade through
the WTO have made limited progress. Failure to get agreement on
the DDA in WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancun in 2003 was only
compensated by limited progress at the Hong Kong Ministerial
meeting in December 2005. Since then, deadlines after deadlines
have been set but to no avail. WTO members are now working
towards completing the agriculture and DDA negotiation by the end
of 2007.
2 South Centre, "The Development Dimension of the Agriculture
Negotiations", in Policy Brief* no. 7 (April 2007), Geneva, p.2.

468

Indonesian Journal of International Lcnv

Doha Development Agenda Negotiation on Agricultural Sector

The agriculture negotiation is further complicated by the fact
jt is part of the single undertaking commitment of the DDA as
jated in the Doha Declaration. This links the agriculture
}tiation$ to the conditions of liberalization commitments to be
D- j^rtaken by WTO members such as in the negotiations on Nonculture Market Access (NAMA), Services, Rules, Trade and
and TRIPs.
o rio&a* ft*r Dealing with the Agricultural Issues
Agriculture plays a central role in developing countries'
0Ornies and the wellbeing their people. At least 50 per cent of
the population in developing countries depends on fanning and
-culture for their livelihood, the majority in the form of srnalland subsistence farming. In some developing countries, this
: may rise to about 80 per cent By contrast, in the developed
countries like the United States, only about one per cent of the
is in agriculture.
Many developing countries view their development interests
being adversely affected by the multilateral agreements on
apiculture. This belief is rooted by the experience that while
j veioping countries have given painful concessions during the
Round negotiations, and some have even undergone
autonomous liberalization, no real or effective agriculture
have taken place towards establishing a fairer and more
equitable global agriculture trading system. The political will of
developed countries to reforming their agriculture sector is
Global agriculture trade is clearly an issue that is presently
developed and developing countries. Developing countries,
their antiquated farming system and vast number of small
poor farmers, are at a disadvantage in global agriculture
trade- Given the already substantial amount of government support
subsidies, the predicament of developing countries has further
developed countries to making them the dominance in
ulture trade.

r 3 APr& 2007
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Since the launched of the Doha Round or DDA negotiations,
there has been no significant progress on the reforms in the threepillar of agriculture trade, namely: domestic support, market access,
export competition. Substantial gaps still remain between the
developing and the developed countries, due to the fact that
domestic support of developed countries remains high and continue
to distort world markets. The collapse of the WTO Cancun
Ministerial Conference in September 2003 and the suspension of
the negotiations of Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in July 2006
were significantly due to the Developed-Developing countries
impasse on agriculture.
There are several inter-related aspects in the general problems
facing many developing countries relating to global agriculture
trade. These include: 4
a. The continued high protection of developed countries
agriculture sector, including the maintenance of domestic
support measures and export subsidies. This prevents
developing countries from having access to the agriculture
markets of the developed countries, and also facilitates export
dumping into the developing countries;
b The limited capacity of developing countries to export or to
derive adequate benefits in export, including to climb up the
'Value added" chain of the agricultural products they produce.
This constrains the ability of developing countries to fully reap
the benefits from agriculture trade;
c. The rapid liberalization which is resulting in surges of
agriculture imports into developing countries markets,
depressing domestic the prices, incomes and livelihoods of the
farmers;

4 Martin Khor, "The Commodities Crisis and the Global Trade in
Agriculture: Problems and Proposals'*, in TWN Trade & Development Series, no.
25 (2005), Geneva, Third World Network Publisher, p. 3.
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The imbalance of the current global framework governing
agriculture trade, much to the disadvantages of developing
countries. There are concerns that in the current negotiations at
the WTO, developed countries have not yet to offer to real
significant reduction their agriculture subsidies. Yet developing
countries are being pressured to significantly reduce their tariffs.
This is a difficult situation, as further tariff reductions for
developing countries in the face of continued protection and
subsidies of the developed countries agriculture sector can result
in the surge artificially cheap imports into the developing
countries, threatening the livelihoods and incomes of fanners.
The Issues on Domestic Support
The underlying development concern on the issue of domestic
support relates to unfair competition, faced by developing countries,
in their domestic and export markets, as farm support policies of
developed countries undercut prices of products from developing
countries. There is often confusion on the issue of agricultural
domestic support, in particular: (a) on the difference between the
allowed levels that members commit not to exceed, and the applied
levels of the various subsidies; and (b) on the different types of
domestic support subsidies often referred to "boxes".
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) distinguishes
between different types of domestic support A distinction is made
between "trade-distorting" and non-trade-distorting subsidies.
Members are obliged to fix maximum levels of trade-distorting
subsidies (Amber Box) and to reduce some of these allowed
maximum levels. For subsidies considered non-trade-distorting (the
Green Box), there are no maximum levels, and thus members can
increase these subsidies without limit The developed countries
have been permitted by the AbA to maintain high levels of tradedistorting domestic support or Tbs. These trade-distorting
subsidies are in the three categories:

foofftnteitt 4 Nortior 3 April 2007
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} . The Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) or Amber Box,
which is linked to intervention on agriculture prices and
considered the most trade-distorting;
2. De minimis support, certain amounts of domestic subsidy that
are allowed, calculated as a percentage of the value of
agricultural production; and
3. The Blue Box subsidies, which are supposed to be linked to
setting limits on production, which are also considered tradedistorting but less distorting than the Amber Box.
The AoA obliges developed countries to reduce their total AMS
by 20% and to limit their de minimis support to 10 % of production
value; developing countries have to reduce their AMS by 13% and
limit de minimis support to 20%. The level of the total actual or
applied IDS is presently far below the level of total allowed IDS
for the US and the EU. This is one of the reasons for the present
stumbling blocks to the reaching of an agreement on agriculture
modalities. The claim by the EU that it is offering huge cuts in
agricultural domestic supports is not backed by real actual cuts.
The Issues on Market Access
It has been agreed that tariffs be cut according to a 'tiered
formula," in which there are three of four bands according to tariff
ranges, with the bend of highest tariffs to be cut by the highest
percentage, and so on. The US has proposed that tariffs in
developed countries be cut sharply by 60% to 90%, according to a
tiered formula It wants developing countries to reduce by almost
the same rates. The EU has proposed more lenient cuts for
developed countries and the designation of 8% of tariff lines as
sensitive products which are eligible for even more lenient
treatment. In responding to the EU proposal, the Group of twenty
developing countries or G20 (led by Brazil) estimated that this
proposal would result in average cut of 39%, without yet calculating
the effects on this average of the inclusion of sensitive products.
472

Indonesian Journal of International Law

Doha Development Agenda Negotiation on Agricultural Sector

The G20 is, however, quite ambitious in the cuts it proposed for
developed and developing countries. Its proposal indicates an
average 54% tariff reduction for developed countries and an
average 36% for developing countries.5
The EU offer is seen as inadequate as it would not result in
significant cut, especially in products with high tariffs. The EU
informally indicated it was willing to increase its offer so as to
result in an average tariff cuts around 50% (near to but not reaching
the G20 request of 54%). This new offer is of contingent on an
adequate offer by the US on domestic support. However, the US,
which want an average 66% cut by the EU also indicated that the
EU offer is still inadequate.6
From a development perspective, the developing countries are
most likely to get a bad deal, because there is likelihood that the
developed countries' domestic subsidies will not be really reduced,
or at best only minimal. Thus the developed countries will be able
to continue to dump products that are subsidized at artificially low
prices into the poorer countries market that do not provide subsidies
for their farmers. In this situation, the developing countries are only
able to defend themselves through tariffs, as prohibition and
quantitative restrictions are not avail to developing countries. Yet
developing countries are being obliged to cut their tariffs even more
steeply than during the Uruguay Round, especially since they have
to cut all their tariffs (line by line) by the formula, unlike in the
Uruguay Round when they only had to cut their tariffs by an overall
average of 24%.?
For countries with ceiling bindings, the problem is worsening.
As they have bound all their agricultural tariff at high levels,
applying the tiered formula would mean that these countries have to
cut all their tariffs by the highest or near to the highest rate.
Countries that receive trade preferences will also suffer from the
5 Martin Khor, "The WTO's Doha Negotiations and Iinpasse: A
Development Perspective", in Third World Network (November 2006), Geneva,
p. 7.

6

Ibid.
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erosion of their preference margin. The steeper the tariff cut on
preference products, the more fee erosion of preference.
As a result of MFN liberalization, current duty-free and
quota-free special treatment will be eroded8. Some developing
countries have underscored that their heavy dependence on
unilateral preferential schemes poses serious challenges for their
development prospects, in particular in connection with the
diversification of their exports and strengthening their
competitiveness.
The ACP Group (Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific) has
presented a proposal on market access, which include a formula in
which the developing countries will have to cut their tariffs by
lower rates than in the formula of the US or G20. Also, countries
with ceiling binding do not have to cut their tariffs according to the
tiered formula. And some proposal are made to moderate the tariff
cuts on products that are receiving preferences, so that the loss of
preference margin will not be so great The ACP countries have
proposed to mitigate preference erosion through au appropriate
tariff reduction formula, taking advantage of the provisions of
sensitive products and delaying the implementation of tariff
reduction. It is worth noting however that other developing
countries believe that long-standing preference and preference
erosion should not frustrate development endeavors through MFN
tariff liberalization.9
Tfee Issues OK Export Subsidies
Because only a very small number of developing countries are
entitled to use export subsidies, they have few defensive interests on
this issue. The Hong Kong declaration provides mat developing
country Members will continue to benefit from the provisions of
Article 9.4 of the AoA for five years after the end-date for

This issue is quite sensitive for LDCs and African, Caribbean and Pacific
countries for products such as bananas, sugar, beet fisheries and textiles.
South Centre, Loc.Cit., p. 5.
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elimination of all fonns of subsidies.10 The disciplines on export
competition measures, including export credits and food aid, could
have negative implications for meeting humanitarian and
development needs. Such disciplines will provide for differential
treatment in favour of the least developed and net food importing
countries.
The Hong Kong Declaration agreed on elimination of export
subsidies on agriculture by the end of 2013, and there is also a
stipulation for front-loading, meaning that most reduction to take
place at the start of implementation. The bulk of the developed
countries export subsidies should be eliminated right at the end of
the first year of the implementation period of the outcome of the
negotiations. Developing countries' underlying concern on the
negative impacts of export subsidies, by the developed countries, is
to achieve less distorted competition in domestic and export
markets. In this sense developing countries have called for an end to
export subsidies and measures with equivalent effects, provided by
developed countries.
The WTO must above all aim to eliminate, or at least
minimize, trade barriers and measures that result in trade distortion.
Agricultural subsidization and protectionism in developed
countries, especially the subsidization of exports, clearly and
unequivocally fell into the category of barriers and measures that
must be eliminated. All the evidence points to the feet that radical
reform of the agricultural policies and practices of the US, EU and
Japan will provide a very significant boost to global trade in general
and to agricultural exporting developing countries.'' The
eradication of agricultural export subsidies will also bring to an end
a practice that has contributed very considerably to
10 Aian Matthews, Shallow versos deep Spcecial and
Differential
Treatment (SD7) and the issue of differentiation in the WTO among groups of
developing countrfes.WlQ rules for agriculture compatible with development,
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 2007, p.95.
11 Jean-Pierre Lchmann, "Deconstructing the Doha Development
Agenda", in The world Trade Brief, September 2003, United Kingdom, Agenda
Publishing, p. 34.
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underdevelopnient by ruthlessly undermining prices and other
incentives to develop and modernize in the domestic food markets
of many developing countries.
Special and Differentia! Treatment (SDT) for developing
countries
The WTO legal system recognizes the need for differentiating
commitments undertaken by developing and developed countries.
Conceptually, the rational for SDT is the asymmetry in economic
power that results in unequal gains from the trading system.
Technical assistance provisions were limited to best endeavor
clauses and flexibility of rules was limited to longer implementation
periods. Hence these provisions have been ineffective in terms of
enhancing the capacity of developing countries to appropriate
development gains from liberalization.
Article 15 of the Agreement on Agriculture covers special and
differential treatment for developing countries. There are many
references to such treatment throughout the agreement, including
the Preamble, which notes that developed countries "would take
fully into account" the particular needs and conditions of
developing countries in the implementation of market access
commitment and also recalls that SDT such a longer
implementation periods had been an integral element of the
Uruguay Round negotiations. In addition, apart from market access,
many of the provisions on SDT are of little use to developing
countries, given their inability to provide subsidies (10 per cent de
minimis rule for market supports, and for input subsidies (exempted
from the Amber Box calculation).'2
Paragraph 13 of Doha Declaration stated that SDT measures
shall "be an integral part of tall elements in the negotiations on
agriculture" and these measures should be operationally effective
12 Merlinda D. ingco, Agriculture and the WTO, Creating a Trading
System for Development, A co-Publication of the World Bank and Oxford
University Press, 2004, p. 35.
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and enable developing countries to take account of their
development needs, including food security and rural
development".13 The commitment "to fulfilling the development
dimension of the Doha development Agenda, which places the
interest of developing countries at the heart of the Doha Work
Programme" was reiterated in the July 2004 Framework
agreement14
Most of developing countries have defensive interests in
agriculture and their main priority has been to protect the interest of
the small farmers whose livelihoods and incomes are at risk from
having to compete with imports. Group of developing countries
under the G33 has been righting to establish two instrument that
developing countries can use - "special products" or SP (products
linked to food security, livelihood security and rural development
which they argue should not be subject to tariff reduction or should
be subject to only small reductions) and "special safeguard
mechanism" or SSM (through which tariffs on agricultural products
can be temporarily raised above the bound rates when there is a rise
in import volume or a fall in import price beyond a certain extent to
be negotiated).
The G33 have made a firm stand that there can be an overall
deal to conclude the Doha Work Programme if the provisions on SP
and SSM adequately meet the countries9 needs to protect and
promote food security, farm livelihoods and rural development. The
group has proposed that developing countries be allowed to selfdesignate 20% of agricultural tariff line as SPs. It has also proposed
the price and volume "triggers" that would enable a developing
country to make use of the SSM.16

13 WTO, (WT/M!N(OI)/Dec/l,
Doha Ministerial Declaration 20
November 2001.
14 WTO, WT/L/579. Doha Work Programme, Decision adopted by the
General Council on \t 2004.
15 G33 Comprises 45 Developing and Least Developed Countries.
Indonesia is the Coordinator of the Group.
16 Martin Khor, Loc.Cii., p. 8.
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Developing countries should have the flexibility to designate
an appropriate number of products as Special products. These
products will be eligible for more flexible treatment. This
guarantees that developing countries will have access to this
flexibility in a revised agreement on agriculture and it clarifies that
the basic criteria that should guide the designation of SPs will be
food and livelihood security, and rural development needs. On the
other hand, the texts establishes limits to the possible scope of SPs,
for instance, by requiring that only an appropriate number of
products can be so designated. How this number should be
determined is left to further negotiation, as is the treatment of SPs.
The choice of SPs would be self-designation by developing country
members.17
Key Players in the Agriculture Negotiations
The current negotiations are so difficult to conclude because,
unlike earlier trade round which primarily involved developed
countries and addressed their priorities, are now also addressing
concerns of developing countries. This is because the global trade
regime during the past twenty years has expanded to include
developing countries. As developing countries join global trade
negotiations, they bring their own offensive and defensive concerns.
Offensively, they want to liberalize sectors in which they are
competitive. Defensively, they often involve agricultural sectors
that employ large shares of their population but are not competitive
in global markets.
On the process of the DDA negotiations on agriculture, many
developing countries have spoken up on how only a few members,
Group of four countries or G4 (US, EU, Brazil and India) seern to
be dominating the negotiations. The other WTO members were
expected to wait for the G4 to reach agreement among themselves,
and their role was seen to be confined to endorsing any deal reached
by the four countries. The majority of the members are kept waiting
for the four to make decision. The G4 recently organized an
17
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intensive Senior Officials meetings and Ministerial meetings in
Paris, in order to achieve a breakthrough on agriculture.
The difference priorities of developed and developing
countries cause the DDA negotiations are inevitable to conclude in
the near future. The negotiation might even more complex and
difficult than past negotiation of the Uruguay Round. In order to
provide a basis for further multilateral negotiations in Geneva,
Chairman of Committee on Agriculture of the Special Session
(CoA-SS) circulated a new paper last April 2007, reflected
movement since his draft "possible modalities on agriculture" were
released in June 2006.

Due to unrelenting pressure by the developed-eountty
members of the WTO, led by the US and EU, the DDA negotiations
have veered front thek proclaimed direction oriented to a
development-friendly outcome, toward a "market access" oriented
direction in which developing countries are pressurized to open up
their agricultural sector. A development-oriented outcome of the
agricultural negotiations would have resulted in significant real
reduction in domestic support and in tariffs in agriculture in
developed countries, while enabling developing countries to protect
and promote the interests of their small farmers.
The developed countries do not have a strong political
commitment to reduce their total trade-distorting domestic subsidies
beyond the actual levels or the already planned levels, and not
committing to effectively discipline or limit Green Box subsidies
and thus ensuring their continuation of high subsidization in.
agriculture.
To have a significant progress of the DDA negotiations,
developed countries have to improve their offers on reducing their
total trade-distorting subsidies to level that would significantly cut
their actual or planned levels, including at the product level. There
would be effective disciplines on the Green Box subsidies,
including criteria on which farmers are eligible to receive them, and
Votutnem 4 Nomor 3 April 2007
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limits placed on amounts receivable per fanner, while excluding
corporations.
Developing countries should have enough flexibility in their
market access obligations, including the use of flexibilities in the
tariff reduction formula and in special products and special
safeguard mechanism, which allow them to effectively safeguard
food security, livelihood security and rural development.
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